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# South China Sea and Myanmar Put ASEAN Unity on Trial
- URL: https://www.theglobalvoice.com/south-china-sea-and-myanmar-put-asean-unity-on-trial/
- Published: 2026-11-14T15:34:51.000Z
- Updated: 2026-11-14T15:34:51.000Z
- Description: The Philippines hosts ASEAN’s leaders while confronting China at sea and steering a divided regional response to Myanmar’s conflict.
- Author: TGV Desk
- Tags: Philippines, South China Sea, Myanmar, China, Southeast Asia, ASEAN, geopolitics, The Day So Far, Top Stories, has-audio

The Philippines enters this weekend’s ASEAN summit with two roles that do not sit comfortably together. As the bloc’s chair, it must find language acceptable to every member. As a South China Sea claimant facing repeated confrontations with China, it wants that language to carry consequences.

President Ferdinand Marcos Jr will host leaders in Manila for the [49th ASEAN Summit and related meetings](https://asean.org/secretary-general-of-asean-to-participate-in-the-49th-asean-summit-and-related-summits-in-the-philippines/?ref=theglobalvoice.com) from November 15 to 17\. The gathering comes at the end of the Philippines’ chairmanship, leaving Manila with a final opportunity to advance negotiations on the South China Sea while pressing ASEAN to reconsider how it deals with Myanmar’s prolonged conflict.

ASEAN and China have spent years negotiating a Code of Conduct for the disputed sea. Officials met in [Cebu in January](https://asean.org/the-25th-asean-china-senior-officials-meeting-on-the-implementation-of-the-declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea-convenes-in-cebu-the-philippines/?ref=theglobalvoice.com) and again in [Kuala Lumpur in May](https://asean.org/the-26th-asean-china-senior-officials-meeting-on-the-implementation-of-the-declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea-convenes-in-kuala-lumpur?ref=theglobalvoice.com), but negotiations have yet to settle the provisions that would determine whether the document can restrain behaviour at sea.

Its geographical scope, legal force and enforcement mechanism remain central problems. Without agreement on those points, a code could formalise dialogue without preventing collisions, water-cannon incidents or attempts to obstruct vessels.

For Manila, the costs of ambiguity are immediate. Philippine and Chinese ships continue to operate in close proximity, including beyond the most familiar contested reefs. The recent deployment of a Philippine coastguard vessel to monitor a [Chinese research ship near the Luzon Strait](https://www.theglobalvoice.com/philippines-deploys-largest-coastguard-ship-to-challenge-chinese-research-vessel) illustrated how the pressure is spreading across a wider maritime area.

Myanmar will require a different decision. ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus, adopted after the 2021 military takeover, sought an end to violence, dialogue among the parties, humanitarian access and mediation through a special envoy. ASEAN leaders later conceded that there had been [no substantive progress in its implementation](https://asean.org/asean-leaders-review-and-decision-on-the-implementation-of-the-five-point-consensus-kuala-lumpur-malaysia/?ref=theglobalvoice.com).

Myanmar has consequently been restricted to non-political representation at ASEAN summits and foreign ministers’ meetings. The arrangement signals disapproval but has not changed conditions inside the country. Some governments favour greater engagement with Myanmar’s authorities, while others fear that restoring political representation without progress would surrender the bloc’s remaining leverage.

One proposal under consideration is a [longer-term special envoy](https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/FINAL-Press-Statement-by-the-Chair-of-the-ASEAN-Foreign-Ministers-Retreat.pdf?ref=theglobalvoice.com), replacing the current system in which the role moves with ASEAN’s annual chairmanship. A longer mandate could preserve contacts and institutional memory. Its value would still depend on access to all parties and the ability to deliver assistance beyond areas controlled by the authorities.

India has practical reasons to watch both discussions. Its trade with East Asia passes through the contested maritime region, while Myanmar directly affects India’s border security and connectivity with Southeast Asia. New Delhi’s growing [defence relationship with the Philippines](https://www.theglobalvoice.com/india-and-philippines-take-their-defence-partnership-to-the-next-level/) gives it an additional interest in maritime stability.

The Manila summit will be judged less by another carefully negotiated declaration than by two specific choices: whether ASEAN can give the maritime code meaningful force, and whether it can replace its stalled Myanmar process with sustained diplomacy that reaches beyond official meetings.